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Abstract 
 
If raising and educating children is a private cost to households, while the availability of skilled labor 
supply resulting from the households’ fertility and education choices is a public good, then competitive 
equilibria typically deliver a suboptimal mix of size and skills of the population. In particular, households 
would underinvest in their children education compared to the optimal level. This is the case even if 
households are aware of the increase in savings returns implied by a higher supply of skilled labor and 
manage to coordinate to try to exploit this effect. In a setup devoid of altruistic motives, this paper shows 
that a tax-financed compulsory education is unlikely to implement the optimal steady state, even if the 
mandatory level of education is the optimal one (the system of equations is overdetermined). 
Nevertheless, a pensions scheme that makes payments contingent to the household fertility and 
investment in its children’s education can implement the first-best steady state. The pension scheme is 
balanced period by period by financing pensions through a payroll tax on the increase in children’s labor 
income resulting from their parents’ human capital investment. 
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1. Introduction
The most obvious economic decisions that households make routinely are how much
to work and whether to save or borrow and how (i.e. in what assets) in order to
smooth consumption over time. But households decide also whether to reproduce, to
what extent, and how many resources (time and income) to invest in their children.
These decisions have huge economic consequences in the aggregate. For instance,
everything else remaining constant, changes in the overall fertility rate propagate
across the population pyramid producing variations in the dependency ratio that
may reduce the output per capita for generations as a result. On the other hand,
the impact on output per capita of a fall in the fertility rate may be offset by a
higher investment in children’s education that increases their productivity, so that
a quantity-quality trade-off is faced in the choice of population.
Nevertheless, households make typically reproductive and educational decisions
(possibly only beyond some compulsory elementary schooling in the case of the
latter) independently of each other and disregarding their impact on the aggregate,
given the negligible size of each individual household compared to the entire econ-
omy. As a consequence, the resulting fertility and allocation of resources (including
those devoted to educate children) will typically be suboptimal. In the case of repro-
ductive and education decisions this will certainly be so if the cost of raising children
is a private cost to the household, while its benefit is a public good (through an
increase in the amount and skills of future labor supply, which raises both the return
to savings and the possible pension transfers to the current generation), since under
such conditions households will try to free-ride on other households fertility and ed-
ucation efforts. One may guess that the misalignment of incentives arising from the
fact that households cannot appropriate the returns to their fertility and education
investments is offset by households’ altruism, by which they derive a direct utility
from the quantity and quality of their children or from their well-being. As it will
be shown below the inefficiency of the decentralized fertility and education choices
actually persists even with altruistic parents, the reason being that the source of
inefficiency is actually the inability of households to internalize the externality that
their fertility and education choices have, in the aggregate, on the return to their
own savings.
In this paper, I characterize in an overlapping generations setup devoid of altruism1
1This is without loss of generality, since the results do not change qualitatively if altruistic house-
holds are considered instead.
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the optimal steady state fertility and human capital investment (along with the op-
timal savings and consumption profile), and show that they cannot be a laissez-faire
competitive equilibrium outcome. This is a consequence of the inability of house-
holds to internalize the aggregate impact of their fertility and education decisions
on the return to savings. It is important to note that this result is not just a conse-
quence of the competitive behavior assumption since, as it will be shown below, the
suboptimality of decentralized allocations still happens even if the agents were able
to coordinate their fertility and educational efforts to try to exploit their impact on
the factor prices, and on the return to savings in particular.
The most usual policy used historically to address the problem of households’ un-
derinvestment in education, namely a tax-financed compulsory education, is shown
not to deliver the optimal steady state generically, since the system of equations
characterizing this happens to be overdetermined. I show nonetheless that a pay-
as-you-go social security that makes pensions contingent to the household fertility
and investment in their children’s human capital —and financed by a payroll tax on
the returns of the human capital investment, and not on the entire labor income—
implements the optimal steady state as a competitive equilibrium steady state.
Research addressing the issue of optimal population size goes back to at least Phelps
(1967), followed by the characterization in Samuelson (1975) of the optimal (exoge-
nous) growth rate of the population2 and a subsequent extensive literature. Most of
the literature addresses the issue of population size from the viewpoint of the sus-
tainability of pay-as-you-go pension systems, and the need to tie pension payments
to individual fertility in order to make social security sustainable and implement
the optimal population size has been repeatedly been put forward (see Eckstein
and Wolpin (1985) and, more recently, Abio, Mahieu and Patxot (2004), Michel
and Wigniolle (2007)).
Although many papers on the optimal population size for the sustainability of PAYG
pension schemes have addressed the issue separately from that of parental invest-
ments in their children’s education, there are nonetheless papers in which the two
decisions have been analyzed jointly. Galor and Weil (2002) consider for instance
a household quantity-quality choice of children following the model of household
fertility behavior in Becker (1960). Nevertheless households are supposed to derive
utility from the total income earned by its children, again to offset the fact that
children (both their quantity and quality) are supposed to be costly to parents (in
2Deardoff (1976) and Michel and Pestieau (1993) qualified the results showing the that a solution
to first-order conditions used in Samuelson (1975) could be a minimum instead of a maximum.
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terms of time here, and hence of lost labor income).3
Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2010) consider parents deriving utility from both the
number of children and their utility, but they address directly the problem of the
misalignment of parents’ incentives because of their inability appropriate the returns
of the cost in making children. The authors explore the consequences of granting
to parents property rights over some of theirs children income, but there is no
human capital dimension in their analysis, so that the quantity-quality trade-off is
overlooked.
In Cremer et al. (2006) individuals’ utility depend, as in this paper, only on their
own consumption. As a consequence, parents do not invest in increasing the prob-
ability of having children, which still they somehow arbitrarily have at the lowest
of two exogenously given rates. Moreover, no quantity-quality trade-off is faced by
the households and the only technology available is a storage technology allowing
to transfer the endowment from young to old at an exogenously given fixed return.
Thus any link between reproductive (and educational) choices and savings returns
is again missing.
In this paper, I choose to make the households’ utility depend only on their con-
sumption and not on the number of children or their education. The reason is that
the results are qualitatively the same otherwise, while the presentation gains in clar-
ity.4 I also disconnect the cost of child rearing from that of reproduction: what is
costly is not reproduction per se, but training children to acquire skills beyond those
they are naturally endowed with and are normalized to 1.5 Making such modeling
choices I want to make stand out, albeit in an admittedly oversimplified manner,
relevant mechanisms to take into account in designing the optimal population and
education policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the economy. Sec-
3As a matter of fact, the goal of Galor and Weil (2002) is rather to provide a framework with
endogenous fertility and technological change able to account for the observed pattern of demo-
graphic and technological transition. As a consequence, the paper makes modeling choices leading
to an economy where households do not face a savings problem, voiding of meaning any social
security concern.
4I note nonetheless the differences in footnotes.
5This endowment can encompass anything they learn effortlessly from the very process of social-
ization, which may include different skills depending on the cultural context. On the contrary,
parental investments in human capital refers to those skills that require an effort (in terms of
resources) to be acquired.
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tion 3 characterizes the steady state that a planner maximizing the representative
agent’s utility would choose (Proposition 1). Section 4 addresses the problem from
the viewpoint of a representative agent operating under competitive conditions. Sec-
tion 5 characterizes the resulting competitive equilibria, in which the fertility rate
remains undetermined and no effort is made by parents to endow their children with
an extra amount of human capital beyond the costless one (Proposition 2). Since
the planner instead does invest resources in educating children, it turns out that
the planer’s optimal steady state is never a competitive equilibrium steady state
(Proposition 3). Section 6 shows that the conditions under which a compulsory
education financed by taxes implements the optimal steady state generically not
satisfied. Section 7 shows that the planner’s steady state can nonetheless be imple-
mented as a competitive equilibrium steady state by a pensions scheme contingent
to both individual fertility and parental education effort —the scheme is financed
by a tax on the excess income resulting form education (Proposition 3). At the
competitive equilibrium decentralizing the planner’s steady state, all the necessary
intergenerational transfers are carried by the pension scheme and the demand for
any other asset fulfilling that role is zero. Section 8 shows that nonetheless the
presence of such an asset is essential, even if in zero demand at equilibrium, since
removing it prevents the planner steady state to be implementable this way. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
2. The economy
Consider an economy of 2-period lived overlapping generations of agents (house-
holds) that, when young, can supply labor and reproduce at the rate of their choice.
Consumption can be produced out of labor and capital (the amount previously pro-
duced but not consumed). Returns to scale are constant, both factors are needed
for production, and without loss of generality capital is supposed to depreciate com-
pletely in one period for the sake of simplicity. Households derive utility only from
consumption6 so that they supply labor inelastically. Reproduction per se is not
costly, but taking care of children (i.e. “educating” them) is. On the other hand,
educating children increases the effective units of labor they will supply.
In principle, households have an interest in a high supply of effective labor when
they will be old, in order to get the most of their capital savings. Indeed, the more
6While households can derive also utility from children and their education, the conclusions stay
the same (differences are relegated to footnotes for the sake of clarity in the presentation).
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households reproduce —costlessly as long as they do not make an extra effort in-
crease their children’s human capital—, the more labor (although unskilled) will be
available for production next period, increasing output, but at the same time there
will be more mouths to feed, putting pressure on resources tomorrow. Alternatively,
effective labor can be increased tomorrow reproducing less today but increasing the
investment in education instead. The problem is that while reproduction is costless,
education is not, so that doing so puts pressure on resources today.
Clearly, as long as the education costs are born by households while its returns
cannot be appropriated by them, households will underinvest in it, hoping to free-
ride on the others. But if the returns to education exceed its cost this is inefficient.
What is then the optimal mix of quantity and quality of labor for the society? Can
that optimal combination be the result of decentralized choices of individuals in a
competitive setup? If not, is there some some policy intervention that makes of the
optimal quantity and quality of population a competitive outcome? These are the
questions addressed in the following sections.
3. The optimal steady state
Consider a planner seeking to maximize the steady state utility of the representative
household. The planner chooses a steady state profile of consumptions c0, c1, per
worker capital savings k, a population growth factor n,7 and an investment in its
children education or human capital h, solution to8
max
0≤c0,c1,k,n,h
u0(c0) + u1(c1)
n
[
c0 + k + e(nh)
]
+ c1 ≤ F
(
k, n(1 + h)
)
On the right-hand side of the feasibility constraint, F being a neoclassical produc-
tion function, no output is produced as soon as reproduction stops and therefore
7So that population grows between periods by a factor of n , meaning that a household has n
households as descendants (the basic economic agent here is the household, and the mating process
of individuals is thus overlooked). Therefore n does not correspond to the commonly used Total
Fertility Rate defined as the average number of children born to a woman, but to roughly half
of it. Specifically, the replacement rate, which in terms of TFR is (slightly over) 2, in this setup
corresponds to n = 1 (in this simple setup abstraction is made of the slight excess of boys over
girls in births and of factors like child mortality).
8Alternatively, the objective function is u0(c0) + u1(c1) + φ(nh) if the household derives utility
from the number and education of its children.
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labor supply evaporates. Also the term e(nh) in the constraint is the cost of pro-
ducing n children able to supply each 1 +h (efficiency) units of labor (if h = 0 they
are supposed to be able to supply one unit of unskilled labor). This cost is supposed
to satisfy e(0) = 0 = e′(0) and e′ > 0, e′′ > 0 for strictly positive levels of education
investment.9
Since both labor and capital are assumed to be necessary for positive production,
an assumption that u′i(0) = +∞, for i =, 1, 2, guarantees then that, at the solution,
it must hold k, n > 0. Also, for any given k, n > 0, the output net of resources
invested in education is maximized by an h ≥ 0 such that
FL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
− e′(nh)n ≤ 0
and
h
[
FL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
− e′(nh)n
]
= 0
so that e′(0) = 0 implies h > 0 as well. Therefore, the solution to the planner’s
problem is necessarily interior and, since the feasibility constraint can in that case
be written (dividing both sides by n > 0) as
c0 +
c1
n
+ k + e(nh) ≤ F
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
then the solution to the planner’s problem is necessarily characterized by10
(1) the FOCs
u′0(c0)
u′1(c1)
0
0
0
 = λ

1
1
n
1− FK
(
k
n , 1 + h
)
1
n
− c1n2 + e′(nh)h+ FK
(
k
n , 1 + h
)
k
n2
e′(nh)n− FL
(
k
n , 1 + h
)

for some λ ≥ 0
9Note that the cost e(nh) of producing any amount n of unskilled labor, i.e. with h = 0, is zero,
since e(n0) = 0.
10The planner’s problem is not convex (the constrained set is the upper contour set of a function
that is not even quasi-concave) so that the FOCs are only necessary. Nonetheless, the sufficient
conditions for a local maximum are satisfied if (i) the agent exhibits a relative risk aversion bigger
than one in his second period of life, and (ii) the maximum output net of capital savings and
fertility and education costs is concave in fertility and has a small enough elasticity (below 2 in
absolute value, see Appendix).
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(2) and the feasibility constraint
c0 +
c1
n
+ k + e(nh) = F
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
(since λ > 0 necessarily from any of the first two coordinates in the vectors
above),
The conditions characterizing necessarily the steady state chosen by the planner are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the overlapping generations economy considered —with a fer-
tility choice and an education investment in the descendants labor productivity—
the optimal steady state levels of consumption, savings, fertility, and education
investment are all strictly positive and satisfy11
u′0(c0)
u′1(c1)
= n = FK
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
= FL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
e′(nh)−1
c0 +
c1
n
+ k+e(nh) = F
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
c1
n
= Fk
(k
n
, 1 + h
)k
n
+ e′(nh)nh
In the next sections we’ll characterize the steady state that would result from the
decentralized choices of the agents.
4. The market steady state
Consider the representative household born at period t. It chooses a profile of con-
sumptions ct0, c
t
1, capital savings k
t, monetary savings M t, fertility nt, and children’s
11When a utility φ(nh) is derived from the offspring, the third condition in the first line becomes
φ′(nh)
u′(c0)
= e′(nh)− 1
n
FL(
k
n
, 1 + h).
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education ht such that it solves
max
0≤c0,c1,k,M,n,h
u0(c0) + u1(c1)
c0 + k +
M
pt
+ e(nh) ≤ wt(1 + ht−1)
c1 ≤ rt+1k + M
pt+1
given monetary prices for the consumption good pt, pt+1, the real wage wt, the
return to capital savings rt+1, and the effective units of labor chosen by his parents
ht−1.
Since ht enters only as a cost to the household, it will be zero at the solution. This
leaves the fertility nt undetermined at a level that can be assumed to be positive
(and determined by sociological or cultural factors) since it entails no cost for the
household given its choice ht = 0.12
The solution to the representative agent’s problem is necessarily characterized by
nt > 0
ht = 0
along with the first-order conditions
u′0(c
t
0)
u′1(c
t
1)
0
0
 = λt

1
0
1
1
pt
+ µt

0
1
−rt+1
− 1pt+1

12Alternatively, given that there is a representative agent per generation, the second period budget
constraint is actually
c1 ≤
(
rt+1k +
M
pt+1
if n > 0
0 if n = 0
since capital and monetary savings become worthless should the representative agent (i.e. ev-
eryone) choose not to have any descendants. In case of heterogeneous agents, savings become
worthless only if all agents within a generation choose not to reproduce. Anyway, given the as-
sumptions made, there is no point in choosing that in order to avoid child-rearing costs since it
is not reproduction but education that is costly. Thus a marginal utility of second period con-
sumption u′1(c1) going to infinity as c1 vanishes will ensure that every agent chooses some positive
fertility n > 0. In effect, doing so guarantees that his second period income is not zero without
necessarily costing him anything since he has always the choice of setting ht = 0.
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for some λt, µt > 0, and the budget constraints
ct0 + k
t +
M t
pt
+ e(ntht) = wt(1 + ht−1)
ct1 = rt+1k
t +
M t
pt+1
That is to say, given pt, pt+1, wt, rt+1 and ht−1 generation t chooses ct0, c
t
1, k
t,M t, nt
and ht such that
u′0(c
t
0)
u′1(c
t
1)
=
pt
pt+1
= rt+1
ct0 + k
t +
M t
pt
+ e(ntht) = wt(1 + ht−1)
ct1 = rt+1k
t +
M t
pt+1
ht = 0
nt > 0
with fertility being guaranteed to be positive but at a level left undetermined, which
allows for the possibility that the positive level fertility is pinned down by factors
other than economic in a world in which children play no direct role in the old-age
support of parents.
A solution to these conditions cannot be a minimum since the associated Lagrangian
L(λt0, λt1, ct0, ct1, kt,M t) = u0(ct0) + u1(ct1)
− λt0[ct0 + kt +
M t
pt
+ e(ntht)− wtht−1]
− λt1[ct1 − rt+1kt −
M t
pt+1
]
has a Hessian 
0 0 −1 0 −1 − 1pt
0 0 0 −1 rt+1 1pt+1
−1 0 u′′0(ct0) 0 0 0
0 −1 0 u′′1(ct1) 0 0
−1 rt+1 0 0 0 0
− 1pt 1pt+1 0 0 0 0

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whose principal minors of order 5 and 6 satisfy respectively
(−1)5H(6)5 = −(u′′0 + r2t+1u′′1) > 0
(−1)5H(5)5 = −(
1
p2t
u′′0 +
1
p2t+1
u′′1) > 0
(−1)5H(4)5 = 0 ≥ 0
(−1)5H(3)5 = 0 ≥ 0
(−1)6H6 = 0 ≥ 0
(where, for each i, H(i)5 stands for the principal minor of order 5 resulting from
deleting the i-th row and column) which implies that a solution to the first-order
conditions is not a minimum since the second order necessary conditions for a
minimum are not satisfied. Moreover, the second order necessary conditions for
a maximum are satisfied and, although the second order sufficient conditions are
not, the existence itself of a maximum is guaranteed by the compactness of the
budget set and the continuity of preferences.
The output per worker at t is given by
yt = F
(kt−1
nt−1
, 1 + ht−1
)
where nt−1 is the rate of growth of the population chosen by generation t − 1, so
that
wt = FL
(kt−1
nt−1
, 1 + ht−1
)
rt+1 = FK
(kt
nt
, 1 + ht
)
A competitive equilibrium is then characterized by a sequence of prices pt and
profiles of consumptions, savings, fertility and education choices ct0, c
t
1, k
t,M t, ht, nt
11
such that, for all t, they satisfy
u′0(c
t
0)
u′1(c
t
1)
=
pt
pt+1
= FK
(kt
nt
, 1
)
ct0 + k
t +
M t
pt
= FL
(kt−1
nt−1
, 1
)
ct1 = FK
(kt
nt
, 1
)
kt +
M t
pt+1
M t
M t+1
= nt
—where the last condition is equivalent to the feasibility of the allocation of resources—
along with
nt > 0
ht = 0
Thus, at a steady state a competitive equilibrium is characterized by the conditions
stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. In the overlapping generations economy considered —with a fer-
tility choice and an education investment in the descendants labor productivity—
a competitive equilibrium steady state is characterized by c0, c1, k,m, n, h > 0 such
that h = 0 and13
u′0(c0)
u′1(c1)
= n = FK
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
c0 + k +m+ e(nh) = FL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
(1 + h)
c1
n
=FK
(k
n
, 1 + h
)k
n
+m
13When a utility φ(ntht) is derived from the offspring, at the solution h > 0 holds, and moreover
φ′(nh)
u′(c0)
= e′(nh).
12
Since, at a competitive equilibrium steady state h = 0 while the planner would
choose a h > 0, the next property follows straightforwardly from Propositions 1
and 2.14
Proposition 3. In the overlapping generations economy considered —with a fer-
tility choice and an education investment in the descendants labor productivity—
no competitive equilibrium implements the optimal steady state.
Implementing the optimal steady state therefore requires, according to Proposition
3, intervening in order to try to steer the decentralized choices towards the optimal
ones. Historically, a compulsory basic education financed through taxes has indeed
been the most common policy to address the problem of a possible underinvestment
in education by individual households. Alternatively, I consider also a policy that
makes households pensions contingent to their choices on fertility and children’s
education. It turns out that the conditions under which such a policy implements
the optimal steady state are much less stringent than those required for a tax-
financed compulsory education to attain the same goal. In the following sections
we will consider what does the introduction of tax-financed public education change,
and then what fertility and education contingent pensions change.
Before that, next section addresses the question of whether the households could
nonetheless attain the optimal steady state on their own in a decentralized way,
without any need of intervention, by internalizing in their choices the impact they
have on the factor prices (assuming they could coordinate on deviating from a
competitive behavior). It will turn out that the answer is no because even though
they will choose their fertility and education efforts only in order to maximize the
returns to their own savings, taking the return to their labor services as given by
the previous generation choices.
5. Impact of fertiltity and education on factor prices
In the absence of an altruistic motive by which the agents derive direct utility from
having children, and possibly from educating them as well, it is clear that in the
14When a utility φ(ntht) is derived from the offspring, Proposition 3 follows from the wedge
that the planner drives between the marginal cost of educated children and the marginal rate of
substitution between them and first-period consumption (see footnotes 11 and 13).
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previous setup the agents fail to realize the indirect benefits from the skilled labor
supplied by an educated offspring via its effect on factor prices in general, and on
the returns to their savings when old in particular. Actually, even if they were
aware of those effects, the lack of coordination on positive levels of n and h and the
possibility of free-riding on everybody else’s reproductive and educational efforts
can only partially explain the suboptimality of the decentralized outcome. As a
matter of fact, even if they were able to coordinate to exploit the impact of their
fertility and education choices on the return to their savings, they would still miss
the optimal steady state, as shown in what follows.
In effect, consider a representative agent born at t choosing a profile of consumptions
ct0, c
t
1, capital savings k
t, monetary savings M t, fertility nt, and children’s education
ht such that it solves
max
0≤c0,c1,k,M,n,h
u0(c0) + u1(c1)
c0 + k +
M
pt
+ e(nh) ≤ wt(1 + ht−1)
c1 ≤ FK
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
k +
M
pt+1
given monetary prices for the consumption good pt, pt+1, the real wage wt (which
is determined by the choices kt−1, nt−1, ht−1 made by the previous generation),
and the effective units of labor chosen by his parents ht−1. Note that in solving
the problem above generation t is aware of the impact that its reproductive and
educational choices (as well as its capital savings) have on the return to its own
savings.
The solution to the representative agent’s problem is now characterized by the first-
order conditions15

u′0(c
t
0)
u′1(c
t
1)
0
0
0
0
 = λt

1
0
1
1
pt
e′(ntht)ht
e′(ntht)nt
+ µ
t

0
1
−FK − FKK ktnt
− 1pt+1
FKK
kt
(nt)2
−FKLkt

15with obvious notation for FK , FKK and FKL.
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for some λt, µt > 0, and the budget constraints
ct0 + k
t +
M t
pt
+ e(ntht) = wt(1 + ht−1)
ct1 = FK
(kt
nt
, 1 + ht
)
kt +
M t
pt+1
That is to say, an equilibrium is characterized by a sequence {ct0, ct1, kt,M t, ht, pt}t∈Z
such that, for all t,
u′0(c
t
0)
u′1(c
t
1)
=
pt
pt+1
= FK + FKK
kt
nt
= FKL
kt
nt
e′(ntht)−1
= −FKK k
t
nt
[e′(ntht)ntht]−1
ct0 + k
t +
M t
pt
+ e(ntht) = FL
(kt−1
nt−1
, 1 + ht−1
)
(1 + ht−1)
ct1 = FK
(kt
nt
, 1 + ht
)
kt +
M t
pt+1
M t
M t+1
= nt
(where the last condition is equivalent to the feasibility of the allocation of resources)
Note that fourth equality (of the second and the third lines) implies, given the 0-
homogeneity of FK , that
ktht = 1 + ht
meaning that necessarily ht > 0, so that parents do invest in their children educa-
tion. Nevertheless, such a steady state is characterized then by
u′0(c0)
u′1(c1)
= n = FK + FKK
k
n
= FKL
k
n
e′(nh)−1
kh = 1 + h
c0 + k +m+ e(nh) = FL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
(1 + h)
c1
n
=FK
(k
n
, 1 + h
)k
n
+m
which cannot coincide with the optimal steady state either, since the latter requires
rather
n = FK .
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Is this because only the impact on capital returns (and not on wages) is internalized?
Consider a planner taking into account the impact on both returns to capital and
wages but constrained to remunerate factors by their marginal productivities, so
that it solves
max
0≤c0,c1,k,m,n,h
u0(c0) + u1(c1)
c0 + k +m+ e(nh) ≤ FL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
(1 + h)
c1 ≤ FK
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
k + nm
The solution to the representative agent’s problem is now characterized by the first-
order conditions16
u′0(c0)
u′1(c1)
0
0
0
0
 = λ

1
0
1− FLK 1+hn
1
e′(nh)h
e′(nh)n− FL − FLL(1 + h)
+ µ

0
1
−FK − FKK kn−n
FKK
k
n2−FKLk

for some λ, µ > 0, and the budget constraints
c0 + k +m + e(nh) = FL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
(1 + h)
c1 = FK
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
k + nm
That is to say, an equilibrium is characterized by a sequence {ct0, ct1, kt,M t, ht, pt}t∈Z
such that, for all t,
u′0(c0)
u′1(c1)
= n =
FK + FKK kn
1 + FLK 1+hn
=
FKLk
e′(nh)n− FL − FLL(1 + h)
= −FKK k
n
[e′(nh)nh]−1
c0 + k +m + e(nh) = FL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
(1 + h)
c1 = FK
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
k + nm
16with obvious notation for FK , FKK and FKL.
16
which again cannot coincide with the optimal steady state either, since the latter
requires rather
n = FK .
6. The market steady state with tax-funded compulsory education
In order to see whether in this setup tax-funded compulsory education is able to im-
plement the optimal steady state, consider a representative agent born at t choosing
a profile of consumptions ct0, c
t
1, capital savings k
t, monetary savings M t, fertility
nt, and children’s education ht that solves17
max
0≤c0,c1,k,M,n,h
u0(c0) + u1(c1)
c0 + k +
M
pt
+ e(nh) ≤ wt(1 + ht−1 + hpt )− Tt
c1 ≤ rt+1k + M
pt+1
given monetary prices for the consumption good pt, pt+1, the real wage wt, the
return to capital savings rt+1, the increase of his own endowment in effective units
of labor chosen by his parents ht−1 and the increase imposed by the government hpt
and financed through a lump-sum tax Tt.18
The solution to the representative agent’s problem is characterized by
nt > 0
ht = 0
17If the household derives utility also from the number and education of its children, so that the
objective function is u0(ct0) + u1(c
t
1) + φ(n
t(ht + hpt )), this policy leads to unbounded fertility,
since the household will choose to set ht = 0 and nt → +∞. This is a consequence of the fact
that costs induced by fertility other than education costs are left out of the picture for the sake of
simplicity.
18Again in the second budget constraint, which is more precisely
c1 ≤
(
rt+1k +
M
pt+1
if n > 0
0 if n = 0
the representative agent internalizes the impact of the fertility choice on the real value of savings.
A marginal utility of second period consumption u′1(c1) going to infinity as c1 vanishes ensures
again that the representative agent chooses some n > 0.
17
(since n = 0 implies c1 = 0 while u′1(0) = +∞) along with the first-order conditions
u′0(c
t
0)
u′1(c
t
1)
0
0
 = λt

1
0
1
1
pt
+ µt

0
1
−rt+1
− 1pt+1

for some λt, µt > 0, and
ct0 + k
t +
M t
pt
+ e(ntht) = wt(1 + ht−1 + h
p
t )− Tt
ct1 = rt+1k
t +
M t
pt+1
That is to say, the households choice is characterized by
u′0(c
t
0)
u′1(c
t
1)
=
pt
pt+1
= rt+1
ct0 + k
t +
M t
pt
= wt(1 + ht−1 + h
p
t )− Tt
ct1 = rt+1k
t +
M t
pt+1
ht = 0
nt > 0
The output per worker at t is hence given by
yt = F
(kt−1
nt−1
, 1 + hpt
)
where nt−1 is the rate of growth of the population chosen by generation t − 1, so
that
wt = FL
(kt−1
nt−1
, 1 + hpt
)
rt+1 = FK
(kt
nt
, 1 + hpt+1
)
and the government budget will be balanced at t if, and only if,
Tt = e(nth
p
t+1)
18
Thus, given a compulsory education policy {hpt }t and the taxes allowing to finance it
{Tt}t, a competitive equilibrium is characterized by a sequence {ct0, ct1, kt,M t, ht, pt}t
such that, for all t,
ht = 0
nt > 0
and
u′0(c
t
0)
u′1(c
t
1)
=
pt
pt+1
= FK
(kt
nt
, 1 + hpt+1
)
ct0 + k
t +
M t
pt
= FL
(kt−1
nt−1
, 1 + hpt
)
(1 + hpt )− Tt
ct1 = FK
(kt
nt
, 1 + hpt
)
kt +
M t
pt+1
M t
M t+1
= nt
where the last condition is equivalent to the feasibility of the allocation of resources
if
Tt = e(nth
p
t+1)
In particular, a competitive equilibrium steady state under an education policy
hp and the taxes T = e(nhp) paying for it, is then characterized by h = 0 and
{c0, c1, k,m, n} such that
u′0(c0)
u′1(c1)
= n = FK
(k
n
, 1 + hp
)
c0 + k +m = FL
(k
n
, 1 + hp
)
(1 + hp)− e(nhp)
c1
n
=FK
(k
n
, 1 + hp
)k
n
+m
with
n > 0
but undetermined.
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Since the planner’s steady state is necessarily characterized by
u′0(c0)
u′1(c1)
= n = FK
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
= FL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
e′(nh)−1
c0 +
c1
n
+ k+e(nh) = F
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
c1
n
= Fk
(k
n
, 1 + h
)k
n
+ e′(nh)nh
(P)
then the planner’s steady state can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium
steady state if under the policy hp = h the choice c0, c1, k,m, n is such that
FK
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
= FL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
e′(nh)−1
m = e′(nh)nh
Note that, while the characterization of a competitive equilibrium steady state un-
der this policy has one degree of freedom (it leaves fertility undetermined), the
conditions for it to implement the optimal steady state impose two additional equa-
tions, which makes the system overdeterminate, generically. Proposition 4 below
summarizes this result.
Proposition 4. In the overlapping generations economy considered —with a fer-
tility choice and an education investment in the descendants labor productivity—
a competitive equilibrium steady state c0, c1, k,m, n under a balanced-budget tax-
financed compulsory education hp does not implement the planner’s steady state,
generically.19
Note that, while the characterization of a competitive equilibrium steady state has
one degree of freedom (it leaves the fertility undetermined), the conditions for it to
implement the optimal steady state impose on it two additional equations, with the
risk of overdeterminacy.
The next section shows that an old-age transfer scheme that is contingent to house-
holds’ fertility and education choices can implement the optimal steady instead.
19In the space of endowments, technology, and preferences of the economy.
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7. Fertility-education contingent pensions
Consider instead an overlapping generations economy with a representative agent
born at t choosing a solution (ct0, c
t
1, k
t,M t, nt, ht) to the problem20
max
0≤c0,c1,k,M,n,h
u0(c0) + u1(c1)
c0 + k +
M
pt
+ e(nh) ≤ wt(1 + (1− τ)ht−1)
c1 ≤ rt+1k + M
pt+1
+ τwt+1nh
given pt, pt+1, wt, rt+1,ht−1 and τ .
The solution to the problem of agent t is interior under the assumptions made,21
characterized by the first-order conditions

u′0(c
t
0)
u′1(c
t
1)
0
0
0
0
 = λt

1
0
1
1
pt
hte′(ntht)
nte′(ntht)
+ µ
t

0
1
−rt+1
− 1pt+1
−τwt+1ht
−τwt+1nt

20Once more the second-period budget constraint is, more precisely,
c1 ≤
(
rt+1k +
M
pt+1
+ τwt+1n(h− 1) if −1 < n
0 if −1 = n
21As with the planner, e′(0) = 0 prevents ht from being 0, since the maximum present value of
the pension net of education investment is characterized by
pt+1
pt
τwt+1n− e′(nh)n ≤ 0
and
h
hpt+1
pt
τwt+1n− e′(nh)n
i
= 0
for any n > 0 (the convexity of e guarantees that the present value of the pension net of education
investment is not maximized by n = 0).
21
for some λt, µt > 0, along with
ct0 + k
t +
M t
pt
+ e(ntht)) = wt(1 + (1− τ)ht−1)
ct1 = rt+1k
t +
M t
pt+1
+ τwt+1ntht
That is to say, the agent would choose ct0, c
t
1, k
t,M t, nt, ht such that22
u′0(c
t
0)
u′1(c
t
1)
=
pt
pt+1
= rt+1 = τwt+1e′(ntht)−1
ct0 + k
t +
M t
pt
+ e(ntht) = wt(1 + (1− τ)ht−1)
ct1 = rt+1k
t +
M t
pt+1
+ τwt+1ntht
while the output per worker at t is given by
yt = F
(kt−1
nt−1
, 1 + ht−1
)
where nt−1 is the rate of growth of the population chosen by generation t − 1, so
that
wt = FL
(kt−1
nt−1
, 1 + ht−1
)
rt+1 = FK
(kt
nt
, 1 + ht
)
Therefore, for a given τ , a competitive equilibrium is characterized by a sequence
{ct0, ct1, kt,M t, nt, ht, pt}t such that, for all t,
u′0(c
t
0)
u′1(c
t
1)
=
pt
pt+1
= FK
(kt
nt
, 1 + ht
)
= τFL
(kt
nt
, 1 + ht
)
e′(ntht)−1
ct0 + k
t +
M t
pt
+ e(ntht) = FL
(kt−1
nt−1
, 1 + ht−1
)
(1 + (1− τ)ht−1)
ct1 = FK
(kt
nt
, 1 + ht
)
kt +
M t
pt+1
+ τFL
(kt
nt
, 1 + ht
)
ntht
M t
M t+1
= nt
22When utility φ(ntht) is derived from the offspring, the third condition in the first line becomes
φ′(ntht) = u′0(c
t
0)e
′(ntht)− u′1(ct1)τwt+1.
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—where the last condition is equivalent to the feasibility of the allocation of re-
sources.
For a given τ , a competitive equilibrium steady state is characterized by {c0, c1, k,m, n, h}
such that
u′0(c0)
u′1(c1)
= n = FK
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
= τFL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
e′(nh)−1
c0 + k +m+ e(nh) = FL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
(1 + (1− τ)h)
c1
n
= FK
(k
n
, 1 + h
)k
n
+m+ τFL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
h
Note that there is one degree of freedom in the conditions characterizing the com-
petitive equilibrium steady state under this policy. This means that the competitive
equilibrium steady state depends on the value taken by one of the variables. Specif-
ically, if m = 0 the system of equations becomes the system characterizing the
optimal steady state with τ = 1,23 since then the system becomes
u′0(c0)
u′1(c1)
= n = FK
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
= FL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
e′(nh)−1
c0 + k+e(nh) = FL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
c1
n
= FK
(k
n
, 1 + h
)k
n
+ FL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
h
which is equivalent to the planner’s steady steady state system
u′0(c0)
u′1(c1)
= n = FK
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
= FL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
e′(nh)−1
c0 +
c1
n
+ k+e(nh) = F
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
c1
n
= Fk
(k
n
, 1 + h
)k
n
+ e′(nh)nh
given that
FL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
= e′(nh)n.
Proposition 5 below summarizes this result.
23In the general case since
φ′(nh)
u′0(c0)
= e′(nh)− τ FL(
k
n
, 1 + h)
FK(
k
n
, 1 + h)
.
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Proposition 5. In the overlapping generations economy considered —with a fer-
tility choice and an education investment in the descendants labor productivity—
the optimal steady state is the competitive equilibrium steady state c0, c1, k,m, n, h
such that m = 0, under a fertility and education contingent old-age transfer scheme
financed by taxing at a rate τ = 1 the increase in labor income resulting from
parental investment in education.
Note that all the intergenerational transfers needed to implement the planner’s
steady state are realized transferring as fertility-education contingent pension to
agent t at t + 1 the amount τwt+1ntht raised at t + 1 by the payroll tax paid by
agent t+ 1 on the increase in labor income coming from the education investment
made by parents t. As a consequence, there is no need to use another asset to
complement such transfers, whence the condition m = 0. Nevertheless, the presence
of that other asset is essential, even if not demanded at equilibrium, to guarantee
that the rate at which agents can transfer wealth across periods —either saving
in capital or through the fertility-education contingent pension scheme— coincides
with the population growth factor implied by their fertility choice. This becomes
apparent computing the competitive equilibrium steady state of the same economy
without money (see appendix A2).
8. Concluding remarks
The model above shows that the decisions on fertility and education taken by house-
holds in a decentralized way typically lead to a suboptimal steady state. The reason
for that is that producing future skilled labor is a private cost on the returns of which
other households can free-ride.
While the problem has been recognized in the literature, two main innovations are
introduced in the approach followed in this paper. Firstly, rather than wondering
what is the optimal population size households want to produce, I draw the attention
to the fact that it is not just the quantity but also the quality of the population
that matters for the future returns to capital savings. Thus I let the agents choose
both their fertility and how much they educate their children. Secondly, having the
previous literature unnecessarily intertwined the (low) costs of producing kids with
the (high) costs of producing skilled labor out of kids, I disentangle the two and as
a consequence need not relay on altruism or children in the utility function to avoid
the population collapsing.
24
The main results in the paper are, on the one hand, that the competitive equilibria
steady state are typically suboptimal, and on the other hand, that the optimal
steady state can nonetheless be implemented as a competitive equilibrium outcome
if it is put in place a social security whose pension payments are made to depend
on the households’ choices on both fertility and education, and that is financed
by a payroll tax on the increase in labor income of the children. Moreover it is
shown that the common policy of a tax-financed compulsory education is unlikely
to implement the optimal steady state, even if the mandatory education is set to
be the optimal one.
The analysis can and should be extended in many directions, some of which have
been mentioned throughout the paper, but the message stemming from the simple
setup considered here should not change much as a result.
Appendix A1
The planner’s problem can be written equivalently as
max
c0,c1,n>0
u0(c0) + u1(c1)
c0 +
c1
n
≤ φ(n)
where
φ(n) = max
k,h>0
F
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
− k − e(nh)
which, for a neoclassical linear homogeneous production function, is well defined by
the first-order conditions
FK
(k
n
, 1 + h
) 1
n
− 1 = 0
FL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
− e′(nh)n = 0
since the associated Hessian matrix(
FKK
1
n2 FKL
1
n
FKL
1
n FLL − e′′n2
)
is everywhere negative definite, since
FKK
1
n2
< 0
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and
FKK [FLL − e′′n2]− F 2KL > 0
for a linearly homogeneous neoclassical production function
F (K,L) = KaL1−a
Sufficient conditions for the solution to the first-order conditions
φ(n)− c0 − c1
n
= 0
u′0(c0)− λ = 0
u′1(c1)−
λ
n
= 0
λ
[
φ′(n) +
c1
n2
]
= 0
for some λ > 0, of the planner’s problem to be a local maximum require the funda-
mental principal minors of order two and three of Hessian (with border)
0 −1 − 1n φ′(n) + c1n2−1 u′′0(c0) 0 0
− 1n 0 u′′1(c1) λn2
φ′(n) + c1n2 0
λ
n2 λ
(
φ′′(n)− 2 c1n3
)

to have signs (−1)2 and (−1)3 respectively , i.e.∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 −1 − 1n−1 u′′0(c0) 0
− 1n 0 u′′1(c1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 0
(which holds, given the strict concavity of u0 and u1) and∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 −1 − 1n φ′(n) + c1n2−1 u′′0(c0) 0 0
− 1n 0 u′′1(c1) λn2
φ′(n) + c1n2 0
λ
n2 λ
(
φ′′(n)− 2 c1n3
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 0
i.e. (expanding the determinant by the second row and rearranging)
−λ
[
u′′1(c1)
(
φ′′(n)− 2 c1
n3
)
− λ
n4
]
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−u′′0(c0)
λ
n2
[ 2
n
φ′(n) + φ′′(n)
]
− u′′0(c0)u′′1(c1)
( c1
n2
+ φ′(n)
)2
< 0
which is guaranteed as long as
u′′1(c1)
(
φ′′(n)− 2 c1
n3
)
− λ
n4
> 0
and
2
n
φ′(n) + φ′′(n) < 0
i.e., since λ = u′1(c1)n, φ
′(n) < 0 (from applying the Envelope Theorem to φ(n)),
it suffices respectively that
−u
′′
1(c1)
u′1(c1)
c1 > 1
−φ
′′(n)
φ′(n)
n < 2
i.e. that the second-period relative risk aversion is high enough and the elasticity
of φ is low enough (this is sufficient but not necessary).
Appendix A2
Consider an overlapping generations economy like the previous one, with the only
difference that agents can only save in terms of capital. The same policy of fertility-
education contingent pensions financed by a payroll tax on the increase of labor
income due to educations investments is in place.
An interior solution to the problem of agent t is characterized by the first-order
conditions 
u′0(c
t
0)
u′1(c
t
1)
0
0
0
 = λt

1
0
1
hte′(ntht)
nte′(ntht)
+ µt

0
1
−rt+1
−τwt+1ht
−τwt+1nt

for some λt, µt > 0, and
ct0 + k
t + e(ntht) = wt(1 + (1− τ)ht−1)
ct1 = rt+1k
t + τwt+1ntht
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That is to say, the agent would choose ct0, c
t
1, k
t, nt, ht such that
u′0(c
t
0)
u′1(c
t
1)
= rt+1 = τwt+1e′(ntht)−1
ct0 + k
t + e(ntht) = wt(1 + (1− τ)ht−1)
ct1 = rt+1k
t + τwt+1ntht
The output per worker at t is given by
yt = F
(kt−1
nt−1
, 1 + ht−1
)
where nt−1 is the rate of growth of the population chosen by generation t − 1, so
that
wt =FL
(kt−1
nt−1
, 1 + ht−1
)
rt+1 =FK
(kt
nt
, 1 + ht
)
For a given τ , a competitive equilibrium is characterized by {ct0, ct1, kt, nt, ht, pt}t∈Z
such that, for all t,
u′0(c
t
0)
u′1(c
t
1)
= FK
(kt
nt
, 1 + ht
)
= τFL
(kt
nt
, 1 + ht
)
e′(ntht)−1
ct0 + k
t + e(ntht) = FL
(kt−1
nt−1
, 1 + ht−1
)
(1 + (1− τ)ht−1)
ct1 = FK
(kt
nt
, 1 + ht
)
kt + τFL
(kt
nt
, 1 + ht
)
ntht
—the feasibility of the allocation of resources is guaranteed by the budget con-
straints.
For a given τ , a competitive equilibrium steady state is characterized by {c0, c1, k, n, h}
such that
u′0(c0)
u′1(c1)
= FK
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
= τFL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
e′(nh)−1
c0 + k + e(nh) = FL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
(1 + (1− τ)h)
c1
n
= FK
(k
n
, 1 + h
)k
n
+ τFL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
h
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which is not equivalent, even if τ = 1, to the planner’s steady state system
u′0(c0)
u′1(c1)
= n = FK
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
= FL
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
e′(nh)−1
c0 +
c1
n
+ k+e(nh) = F
(k
n
, 1 + h
)
c1
n
= Fk
(k
n
, 1 + h
)k
n
+ e(nh)nh
since, in the absence of money, nothing guarantees that the productivity of capital
is the growth factor of the population implied by the agents’ fertility choice.
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